We study the evolution of preference interdependence in aggregative games which are symmetric with respect to material payo¤s but asymmetric with respect to player objective functions. We identify a class of aggregative games whose equilibria have the property that the players with interdependent preferences (who care not only about their own material payo¤s but also about their payo¤s relative to others) earn strictly higher material payo¤s than do the material payo¤ maximizers. Included in the class are common pool resource and public good games. If each member of the population interacts with each other member (the playing-the-…eld model), we show that any evolutionary selection dynamic satisfying a weak payo¤ monotonicity condition implies that only interdependent preferences can survive in the long run.
Introduction
A standard assumption in the economic modeling of human behavior is that people have independent preferences. Given a choice between two income distributions, they will prefer that in which their own income is higher, regardless of their rank or relative standing in the two distributions. Changes in the incomes of others, provided that their own material circumstances remain unchanged, leave them neither better nor worse o¤, and they are consequently unwilling to sacri…ce any portion of their own material well-being in order to enhance or to diminish the well being of others.
The usual methodological defense of independent preferences is made on evolutionary grounds: units which maximize their own material payo¤s will prosper and thrive, while those that do not will be outperformed and driven to eventual extinction (Friedman, 1953) .
While compelling in the context of perfectly competitive environments, this evolutionary argument runs into di¢culties in imperfectly competitive settings. It is possible in some strategic environments that individuals who care only about their own material well-being obtain strictly lower material rewards in equilibrium than similarly situated individuals who are also concerned with the well-being of others. Our purpose in the present paper is to identify strategic environments of economic importance which give rise to this phenomenon.
Speci…cally, we identify games in which players with independent preferences, who care only about their own (material) payo¤s, earn strictly lower material payo¤s in equilibrium than do players with interdependent preferences, who care additionally about their payo¤s relative to others. This disparity in equilibrium payo¤s has implications for the theory of preference formation. Recent work dealing with the evolution of preferences in strategic environments is based on the methodology that individuals within a generation behave rationally with respect to their inherited (or acquired) preferences, but that the distribution of preferences across the population changes from one generation to the next under pressure of di¤erential material rewards. 1 It is typically assumed in this literature that the evolutionary selection dynamics are payo¤ monotonic, i.e., higher material payo¤s to a heritable trait typically lead to more rapid replication of that trait over time. Consequently, the …nding that the 1 Applications of this methodology include evolutionary explanations of time preference (Rogers, 1994) , risk-aversion (Robson, 1996) , reciprocity (Güth and Yaari, 1992) , altruism among siblings (Bergstrom, 1995) , altruism in general (Bester and Güth, 1998) , preferences for social status (Fershtman and Weiss, 1996) , and systematic errors in expectations (Waldman, 1994) . For an alternative and complementary approach to preference formation based on forward-looking parental socialization see Bisin and Verdier (1997) .
material rewards to those with interdependent preferences strictly exceed the rewards to those with independent preferences leads directly to the implication that evolution will favor the persistence of interdependent preferences in particular classes of strategic environments.
The strategic environments that we consider are aggregative games, in which the (material) payo¤ to any given player depends only on her own action and some aggregate of the actions of all players. The general problem of preference formation can, of course, be studied within the context of any strategic environment. Our focus on aggregative games is motivated by the fact that such environments include common pool resource extraction and public good games, which have been a perennial feature of human societies from the earliest times. Traditional societies even in the present day rely heavily on commonly owned …sheries, grazing lands, and forest areas for their subsistence. Similarly, throughout human history, a large number of essential activities have required collective action of one kind or another, ranging from the hunting of large animals and the construction of housing to the provision of irrigation, harvesting, and defense against encroachment or attack by competing groups. If such environments favor the emergence of preference interdependence, then the use of interdependent preferences to explain experimental and empirical anomalies, and in economic modeling more generally, may be justi…ed on evolutionary grounds.
2
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce a formal framework which makes precise the idea that one type of preference may have a strategic advantage over another. In Section 3 we identify a class of aggregative games in which players with interdependent preferences have a strategic advantage over those with independent preferences, and
show that standard models of common pool resource extraction and public good provision belong to this class. The evolutionary implications of our …ndings are explored in Section 4, in which it is argued that when each member of the population interacts simultaneously with every other member (the "playing the …eld" model), independent preferences cannot survive in the long-run. 3 Section 5 concludes with a discussion of possible extensions and additional applications of our results. 2 The importance and plausibility of interdependent preferences has often been noted (Duesenberry, 1949 , Frank, 1987 , and Cole, Mailath and Postlewaite, 1992 , and is supported by ample empirical and experimental evidence (see Clark and Oswald, 1996 , and references cited therein). It is also well known that the introduction of interdependent preferences into economic models has non-trivial implications in that many conventional results have been either overturned or signi…cantly modi…ed in the presence of such preferences. 3 This result need not hold when individuals are matched to play games within smaller subgroups (as is the case in pairwise random matching models). For reasons discussed in Section 4, however, the playing-the-…eld hypothesis is particularly appropriate in the analysis of aggregative games.
The Nature of the Problem
Let a < b < 1 and consider any symmetric n-person normal form game 
denote the mean material payo¤ at the action pro…le x, and de…ne
Here ½ r (x) stands for the relative payo¤ of individual r at action pro…le x.
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It is important to distinguish between material payo¤s and objective functions because we permit individuals to have objective functions that do not simply require the maximization of material payo¤s. Speci…cally, we suppose that only k 2 f1; 2; :::; n ¡ 1g players are material payo¤ maximizers in the usual sense; their objective functions are increasing in their own material payo¤s and do not depend on the material payo¤s of others. Such persons will be said to have independent preferences. The remaining players are concerned not only with their own material payo¤s but also with their relative payo¤s as de…ned above. To introduce the preferences of these individuals formally, let us …rst de…ne the following collection of real functions:
F is di¤erentiable and @ 1 F; @ 2 F > 0g: 5 We say that a player j has (negatively) interdependent preferences if there exists an F j 2 F such that j's preferences are represented by an objective function ª F j : [a; b] n ! R of the following form:
This particular representation of (negatively) interdependent preferences has recently been proposed and axiomatically characterized by Ok and Koçkesen (1997) . In particular, the preferences represented by (1) can be interpreted as a compromise between the standard case where the individual is assumed to care only about her absolute payo¤ ¼ j , and the 4 To guarantee that ½ r is well-de…ned, we assume throughout that the material payo¤ functions always take strictly positive values. Note that speaking of "relative payo¤s" forces us to evaluate material payo¤ functions in a strictly cardinal manner. This is conceptually unproblematic when payo¤s represent amounts of money, pro…ts, or any homogeneous commodity. 5 Here @ i F represents the partial derivative of F with respect to its ith component. 
with F r 2 F; r 2 J k : Therefore, the primitives of our analysis are the symmetric n-player game ¡, the number of independent players k, and the vector of interdependent objective functions F. Given these primitives, the game ¡ F is fully speci…ed.
An immediate question of interest is the following: are there economically important classes of games ¡ for which, regardless of the population composition k, and the vector of interdependent objective functions F 2 F n¡k , it is the case that at any equilibrium action pro…le of the ¡ F , the material payo¤ to each player with interdependent preferences exceeds the material payo¤ to any player with independent preferences? To state this question precisely, we introduce the following:
De…nition. Let ¡ 2 G and let F 2 F n¡k for some k 2 f1; :::; n ¡ 1g: We say that interdependent preferences yield a strategic advantage over independent preferences in
and
In the next section, we demonstrate that interdependent preferences yield a strategic advantage over independent preferences in a rich class of aggregative games, and provide two economically important examples of games which belong to this class. The evolutionary implications of this …nding are then explored in Section 4.
3 Strategic Advantage
Aggregative Games
The symmetric game ¡´(f[a; b]; ¼ r g r=1;:::;n ) is said to be aggregative if
n , r = 1; :::; n;
where Corchón, 1996 .) Among many interesting aggregative games are the Cournot oligopoly, the common pool resource and public good games, and a number of search theoretic models.
Let ¡ be an aggregative game, so that the payo¤ functions satisfy (5) . Consider the following assumptions:
and jH 1 (a; na)j ? jH 2 (a; na)j and jH 1 (b; nb)j 7 jH 2 (b; nb)j :
While the assumption (7) is made only to rule out some trivial boundary equilibria (and is standard in economic models), assumption (6) is quite crucial for the main result of this section. 7 We denote the class of all aggregative games that satisfy (6) and (7) by A:
The following is the main result of this section.
Theorem 1. Take any k 2 f1; :::; n ¡ 1g and any F 2 F n¡k : For any aggregative game ¡ 2 A; interdependent preferences have a strategic advantage over independent preferences in ¡ F :
The entire analysis of this paper goes through in terms of generalized aggregative games in which while the remaining players are independent. The modi…cation of the proof is straightforward.
Proof. Let ¡ 2 A such that (5) holds with H 1 > 0 and H 2 < 0: (The proof of the case where H 1 < 0 and H 2 > 0 is analogous to that which follows.) Fix any k 2 f1; :::; n ¡ 1g and F 2 F n¡k , and let x be a Nash equilibrium of ¡ F : We begin with a preliminary observation.
Claim 1. x 6 = (a; :::; a) and x 6 = (b; :::; b):
Proof of Claim 1. From the boundary condition H 1 (a; na) > jH 2 (a; na)j ; it follows that there exists a small enough " > 0 such that ¼ i ((a; :::; a) + "e i ) = H(a + "; na + ") > H(a; na) = ¼ i (a; :::; a);
for all i 2 I k ; where e i is the ith unit vector. Since I k 6 = ;; we conclude that (a; :::; a) cannot be a Nash equilibrium. The second part of the claim is proved similarly. k
Now de…ne
First consider the case in which A 1 = ;: In this case, H 1 > 0 and (5) together imply (3) so, since H 1 > 0, the proposition fails to hold only if x j = a for all j 2 J k : But this would imply that x r = a for all r = 1; :::; n; contradicting Claim 1. Therefore, the proposition holds in the case A 1 = ;:
Next consider the case A 1 6 = ;: Let i ¤ be the smallest index that satis…es
and take any j 2 B 1 . Then, by de…nitions of Nash equilibrium and ¡ F ; we must have
By using (1) and (2), we can write the second inequality as
where all the derivatives are evaluated at the equilibrium x: Since H 2 < 0; we must then
which is possible only if
By using this …nding along with (5) and the …rst inequality of (8), we obtain
But since H 11 + H 21 · 0, this implies that x i ¤ < x j : Given H 1 > 0, therefore, we …nd
whereas
We have thus established the following claim.
Notice that H 1 > 0 implies
Therefore, in view of Claim 2, the proof would be complete if B 1 6 = ; or if x i < b for some i 2 I k . But if neither of these statements holds, it must be the case that x r = b for all r = 1; :::; n; which contradicts Claim 1. ¥ Theorem 1 identi…es a class of aggregative games in which interdependent preferences yield a strategic advantage over independent preferences in terms of material payo¤s. The following examples of well-known economic models show that the theorem is both easy to apply and that it has economic signi…cance. The …rst of these examples also helps provide some intuition for the result.
Examples 3.2.1 Common Pool Resource Extraction
Consider a population consisting of n individuals, each of whom has access to a common pool resource. Let x r¸0 denote the extraction e¤ort chosen by individual r, while X = P x r denotes the aggregate extraction e¤ort. There is an opportunity cost w > 0 per unit of extractive e¤ort and each member of the population receives a share of the total product that is proportional to her share of aggregate extractive e¤ort. Total product is given by a twice di¤erentiable and bounded function f : R + ! R + with f(0) = 0 and f 0 (0) > w:
We let A(X)´f (X)=X stand for the average return to e¤ort for all X > 0; and set A(0)´f 0 (0). It is standard to assume that A 0 (X) < 0 for all X > 0: Consequently, by the boundedness of f and A(0) = f 0 (0) > w; there must exist a unique X 0 > 0 such that A(X) Q w whenever X R X 0 : We may then de…ne the common pool resource game
; ¼ r g r=1;:::;n ) by letting
where 0 < a < b < X 0 =n.
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¡ cpr is a minor modi…cation of the widely-studied common pool resource game. Our modi…cations are two-fold. First, by requiring that extraction e¤ort cannot fall below some (arbitrarily small) positive number a; we ensure that ¼ r is positive-valued and that the condition H 2 < 0 of Theorem 1 is satis…ed. Second, we assume that each individual's extractive e¤ort is bounded in such a way that overcrowding can never be so extreme as to yield negative payo¤s (i.e., A(X) < w). This too is required to ensure that ¼ r is positivevalued. 10 Given these assumptions, provided that a is su¢ciently small and b is su¢ciently large (i.e. provided that the action space is su¢ciently rich), it is a straightforward matter to verify that ¡ cpr 2 A: Hence Theorem 1 immediately applies: interdependent preferences have a strategic advantage over independent preferences in the common pool resource game.
Private Provision of Public Goods
Consider an n-person economy in which there is one public good and one private good. Each individual is endowed with an identical level of private good denoted by b > 0. The quantity 9 This formulation, which closely follows Sethi and Somanathan (1996) , is general enough to encompass a variety of institutional settings. For instance, if the output is for agents' own use and a labor market does not exist (as in pre-market societies) one would interpret w as the opportunity cost of the extraction e¤ort in terms of other useful activities. If, on the other hand, the good is sold in a competitive market and a labor market exists, w can be interpreted as the foregone outside wage relative to the price of the product. If the output market is imperfectly competitive, A(X) can be thought of as the product of a decreasing inverse demand function with the average product. 10 Both these assumptions can be relaxed without changing any of our conclusions, though some additional work is required in this case; see Koçkesen et al. (1997a) .
of public good is de…ned as the sum of (voluntary) contributions of individuals which are paid out of their endowments. 11 Since the private good holdings of individual r would be b ¡ x r when she contributes x r to the production of the public good, we may write the absolute payo¤ of person r as a function of the pro…le of the contributions as follows:
where U : R 2 + ! R ++ is a twice di¤erentiable money-metric utility function such that U 1 > 0; U 2 > 0; and U 11 ¡ U 12 · 0: 12 We also postulate the following standard boundary conditions:
This environment induces the (symmetric) game ¡ pg´( f[0; b]; ¼ r g r=1;:::;n ); which we refer to as the public good game. It is routine to check that ¡ pg 2 A under the assumptions stated above. Hence by Theorem 1 we may again conclude that interdependent preferences have a strategic advantage over independent preferences in the public good game.
Preference Evolution
In this section we examine the potential implications of the results obtained above for the evolutionary theory of preference formation. Along the lines of recent work by Fershtman and Weiss (1996) and Bester and Güth (1998), we consider a sequence of generations such that the distribution of preferences is …xed within a generation but varies across generations under pressure of di¤erential material payo¤s. The fundamental selection criterion that we use is a substantially weakened version of the standard notion of "payo¤ monotonicity," which is based on the hypothesis that higher material payo¤s to a heritable trait lead to more rapid replication of that trait over time (see, for instance, Waldman, 1994 , Bergstrom, 1995 or Robson, 1996) . This hypothesis is consistent with a variety of distinct intergenerational 11 If the public good in question is something like the protection of a military front or the irrigation of a common land, this production technology might be found objectionable. preference transmission mechanisms. The most obvious is genetic transmission, in which children inherit the preferences of parents. In this case di¤erential fertility rates drive the selection dynamics and payo¤ monotonicity corresponds to the hypothesis that number of surviving children that each parent leaves behind is an increasing function of the material payo¤s that they earn in their adult life. Similarly, if preferences are acquired by emulation or inculcation within the home, and parents transmit (with or without deliberate intent) their own preferences to their children, then again di¤erential fertility rates will drive the selection dynamics provided that parents raise their own children. If parents raise children that are not biologically their own (for instance through adoption), then high adoption rates in addition to high fertility rates will be important and payo¤ monotonicity implies that wealthier parents will be more likely to adopt. Preferences may also be transmitted through the emulation of non-parents, for instance through the observation of materially successful individuals in society, or may be deliberately inculcated by parents on the basis of criteria which allow for di¤erences in the preferences of parent and child. Each of these transmission mechanisms can give rise to payo¤ monotonic selection dynamics under plausible assumptions.
Consider a sequence of time periods t, in each of which a population of n individuals interact strategically. 13 The material payo¤s arising from the strategic interaction are represented by a symmetric n person game ¡, which is assumed to be the same in all periods.
While some players maximize material payo¤s, we also allow for the possibility that some have negatively interdependent preferences. The set of all available interdependent preferences is an arbitrary …nite set G ½ F with jGj = m: The period t population composition, denoted s t = (s At time t; ¡(s t )´¡ Ft is played. 14 ¡(s t ) can be thought of as a random variable since we shall assume that (s t ) 1 t=0 is a stochastic process. The manner in which the population composition evolves over time will depend on the payo¤s obtained by each preference type at whichever equilibrium of ¡(s t ) happens to be realized in period t. Let N(¡(s t )) represent the set of Nash equilibria of ¡(s t ), ¹ ¼ j (x) the average material payo¤ to individuals with objective function ª F j ; j = 1; :::; m, and ¹ ¼ 0 (x) the average material payo¤ to individuals with independent preferences.
De…nition. The process (s t ) 1 t=0 is said to satisfy weak payo¤ monotonicity if, for all i = 0; :::; m, the following conditions hold:
) and all (some) j 6 = i with s The class of all such processes is denoted by S mon (¡):
The …rst condition entails that the population share of the preference which yields the lowest material payo¤ in any given generation does not grow, and that it shrinks with some positive probability. The second condition states simply that preferences that are driven to extinction under these dynamics do not subsequently recover. Other than these two restrictions, no further property is posited on the behavior of (s t ) 1 t=0 : In particular, this process can be time or history dependent.
In what follows, we shall inquire whether we have
when ¡ 2 A, and when (s t )
In other words, we ask whether weak payo¤ monotonic dynamics imply the elimination of independent preferences in the long run for an arbitrary initial population composition containing both independent and interdependent players. While it may at …rst appear that (13) follows directly from Theorem 1, the following simple example demonstrates that weak payo¤ monotonicity is actually too weak to guarantee this. 
Given this example, it is clear that we have to demand more from the selection dynamics.
A su¢cient (but not necessary) requirement is to assume that probability of the event that s 0 t > 0 is strictly decreasing is bounded away from zero whenever
) and all j 6 = i with s j t > 0. This is not a terribly stringent requirement in that any stationary Markov chain in S mon (¡) satis…es it trivially. In the next result, we shall show that an even weaker assumption is su¢cient to guarantee (13) for all games ¡ 2 A. Theorem 2. Take any K 2 f1; :::; n ¡ 1g; let ¡ 2 A and (s t ) 
15 More generally, suppose that n = 2 and consider any (s t ) 1 t=0 2 S mon (¡) such that the evolution of (s Moreover, again by Claim 1, Prob
Thus, by using the …rst part of (12) and the fact that Prob
Using (17) and (18), we then obtain
Proceeding by induction, therefore, Prob fY t 6 = 0; t = 1; :::;
(1 ¡ ¤ ¾ (jK; jK + K)); T = 1; 2; :::
But then by letting T ! 1 and using (15), we …nd Prob fY t 6 = 0; t = 1; :::
This establishes (16) in view of the continuity of probability measures. ¥ Theorem 2 shows that (13) may hold under a large class of stochastic processes. In particular, it readily establishes that if the selection dynamics are either deterministic or stationary Markov, then weak payo¤ monotonicity implies that the population share of independent agents will eventually shrink to zero in …nite time with probability one. 1=K for all t. Notice that since inf t¸1 ¾(t) = 0; we cannot use Corollary 1 to establish (16) even if (14) is satis…ed. But
and hence by Theorem 2, we may conclude that (16) holds.
then (16) holds.
This observation is quite general and capable of encompassing many di¤erent mechanisms for the intergenerational transmission of preferences. The following example of a parental socialization mechanism provides an illustration.
Example 2. Consider an evolutionary scenario in which the strategic interaction in any generation involves playing a game ¡(s t ); where s t is the period t population composition and ¡ 2 A. For simplicity, we assume that each adult has exactly one child, and there are only two types of admissible preferences. Hence s t = (s for instance, wishes to inculcate preferences in her child which yield the highest value for (1). We assume that each independent parent's socialization e¤orts are successful in period t with probability ³(s 0 t ); where ³ : [0; 1] ! (0; 1) is a decreasing function. 18 If the parent's socialization e¤orts are not successful, the child simply inherits her parent's preferences.
By using Theorem 1, we may readily verify that this socialization mechanism entails a stochastic process (s t ) 1 t=0 which belongs to S mon (¡): On the other hand,
so that by Theorem 2, we may conclude that independent preferences are almost surely driven to extinction in …nite time. 19 k In summary, the results of this section suggest that interdependent preferences eventually eliminate independent preferences in the long run in particular strategic environments. It is important to bear in mind, however, that our analysis has been based on the assumption that each member of the population interacts with each other member. This "playing-the-…eld" hypothesis is a natural starting point for the analysis of preference evolution in aggregative 18 The decreasingness of ³ captures the "oblique" aspect of cultural transmission mechanisms: the more interdependent people there are in the society, the higher is the chance of successful inculcation by the independent parents who implore their children to "do as I say, not as I do!" (Bisin and Verdier, 1997) . 19 This conclusion could not be obtained as easily if parents were to take into account the fact that their decisions might in ‡uence the population composition in the subsequent generation and therefore alter the set of equilibria. Taking this e¤ect into account complicates the decision problem faced by parents quite substantially, however, and demands an improbably sophisticated degree of foresight even when the population size is small. games, since the most common examples of such games have precisely such an interaction structure in mind. Nevertheless, this hypothesis is truly compelling only for small and relatively isolated communities. In the case of larger populations, it may be more plausible to assume that individuals interact in smaller subgroups, either with their geographic or social 'neighbors,' or with individuals with whom they have been randomly matched. In random matching environments (such as those studied by Bester and Güth (1998) and Fershtman and Weiss (1996) ) the link between strategic advantage and evolutionary stability is less immediate and it is entirely possible that preferences which yield a strategic advantage in each interaction may yet earn lower payo¤s on average than preferences that yield a strategic disadvantage. 20 The same is true in local interaction environments of the kind explored by Eshel, Samuelson and Shaked (1998). While an exploration of preference evolution in random matching and local interaction networks is beyond the scope of this paper, it is clearly an interesting and important topic for future research.
Conclusions
The …ndings reported in this paper give some theoretical support to the hypothesis of interdependent preferences. Aggregative games of the type studied here are important from an evolutionary perspective, and the playing-the-…eld hypothesis is a natural starting point for the analysis of preference evolution in the context of such games.
There are several directions in which our results could be extended. It would be interesting to consider the extent to which the main result of Section 3 can be generalized to cover larger classes of games. Determining the class of all normal-form games in which interdependent preferences yield a strategic advantage over independent preferences is largely an open problem (but see Koçkesen et al., 1997b) . Relaxing the restrictive assumption that all objective functions are common knowledge is a task which should also be undertaken in future work. Finally, much work remains to be done with regard to examining the implications of our strategic advantage results within the context of alternative speci…cations of evolution, 20 In Koçkesen et al. (1997a) , preference evolution under pairwise random matching is investigated for the special case of the Hawk-Dove game. The Hawk strategy becomes dominant for interdependent players if their preferences are su¢ciently interdependent, causing a homogeneous population of such players to be vulnerable to invasion by a single independent player (who plays the best response, Dove). Similarly, a population of independent players is vulnerable to invasion by a (su¢ciently) interdependent type since the latter's choice of Hawk elicits a best response of Dove from her opponent. As in Banerjee and Weibull (1995) , and for similar reasons, a polymorphic population prevails in the long run.
such as models of local interaction, and alternative socialization mechanisms.
An interesting application of the present approach concerns the theory of oligopolistic competition. The payo¤ structure of the commons game resembles that of Cournot oligopoly, and suggests that there may be circumstances in which a pro…t seeking shareholder (principal) will instruct the manager (agent) of her …rm to pursue objectives other than the maximization of absolute pro…ts. This issue has already been explored for oligopolistic markets with linear demand and cost functions by Vickers (1985) and Fershtman and Judd (1987) , but our …ndings suggest that the phenomenon will arise much more generally.
Another application concerns the investigation of anomalies frequently observed in experimental games. Our approach appears particularly well suited to explain behavior in ultimatum bargaining games, in which a concern for relative standing would predict the rejection of highly skewed o¤ers and entail fear of retaliation on the part of the …rst movers (see, for instance, Bolton, 1991) . Furthermore, the ultimatum bargaining environment is one in which responders with interdependent preferences will earn higher payo¤s than those with independent preferences, so that evolution operating in this environment is likely to select against the latter. The examination of this issue, and others arising from the present work, are left for future research.
